

Moorestein: 21 March 70

On Report of Chan:

Agree that this is suppression of opposition.
But ~~for~~ to allow free speech, political
activity, would lead to "chaos": complete breakdown
of the GUN; Com takeover. A movement to
"end war" would sweep country: yet people
would not be making a clear choice, accepting
the consequence of a Com takeover and its
aftermath: this they would not foresee clearly;
they would see only short-run consequences.

[Would they not make the same choice
if they did foresee this? So M saying
their expectations are:

- (1) Vague, imprecise;
- or (2) Uncertain
- or (3) Not formed (short time horizon)
- or (4) Wrong (tho the Coms
won't take over; or, that
Com rule will be tolerable).

Hence, their immediate purposes are irrelevant to

our policy. "I don't know what they want; there's no way to find out, to confront them with a true choice." (i.e. to ensure that they foresee consequences the same way M does).

M thinks NLF is wholly controlled from Hanoi:
(But what then? Still necessary to allow it to function as a party. Suppose Com parties in France or Italy were wholly controlled from Moscow: could they be outlawed?)

8 9 9 9



or at least this occasion

Weyand

III Corps


Jan 1

Thang
prosecutor

$\frac{2}{3}$ or $\frac{1}{2}$

defame

Flora: Statute by US



~~Disag~~

Bunker

CMC

20 March

Clan was charged with maintaining

Did he debate after each session?

Did he ever tell CA it was his brother?

Chief Justice: review on 24 March

petition of lawyers;

Const. of petition (prob. incorrect.)

prob. flagrant del (prob. not applicable)

But: statute says decisions not subject
to appeal

Chau right on . - T: notes

- VC - hit blue areas
(Bunker)
- US - fear of coalition

[Question: Why does B think


C a Communist? "Coalition"?

- US: missing gov

B on ~~regards~~ "defensible basis," due process

B on "advice" to Thieu: why not accepted?

(Why Thieu statements?)



Meaning of Thien action same if C knew
no English or American (merely strengthened,
by fact he did).

But his story is significant allegory of:

- missed options for US
- failure — and perhaps ^{about US} illusions — of "good guys"
in VN
- US style in SVN; and tendencies to support
Thien-types.

("Strong man.")

- [Subordinating style of the young, "good guys" — toward
a Chan-type, not a Hien: the young imperialists; like French...]

CA — "He told wrong Americans."

Wasn't loyal enough.

Banker: He saw brother... He's a Comm.

People: He worked for CA. [But: he has suffered, been
abandoned.]

honies

- Beliefs of Van, DE, et al., in C + C approach,
in democracy, in US, in war:
and our fate, + C's
- V/Xen Opinions
- C belief in US: condemned by both Hein and by Comm (and by CIA)
in democracy: villages
Saigon "get of Embassy
had spoken..."
in NA (vs. presence of colleagues in NA, US)
- C opposed to Cons: brutal, first, vs. tradition
(but US, bombing, refs!)
- C willing to accept US role: but wants facade
(vs. Hein; vs. Ng. Min Nien)
- use of ex-VN: Be, Thai, Chi, Chau (Ho Cong
Thao 1/46)
(or even "attentists": Dien)
- C criticized as pro-US; but abandoned by CIA/US as
"not cooperative." (earlier CIA backing.)

Issue is not :

- "democracy" per se
 - Claus's relations with C/A
- = whether C is "guilty"

C. Doctrine : requirements for VNZ
(not, US war)

US is now become the leader
it has shown for VN do not draw the
loyalty of the VNese people."

[It is almost a stamp of anti-Con
zeal and "redism" to believe
that the non-Cons cannot possibly
win a political struggle with the Cons;
... to fear a ceasefire, direct negot
(as with French!)]

... to fear anything but continued
military struggle, sustained by US mil.
presence & involvement

(and action to prevent coups, revolts)

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Cpan

~~M...~~ OR5-2659

L US responsibility for VNam mil:

- reform of RVNAF
- mil. personnel
- mil. gov

US power

past support

Dien cong / Quang counter

Struggle

believe we use power

- Hence, we are blamed for mil. acts,
(and for enforcing mil. rule)
("no war to oppose")
- We are expected / believed to intervene
(helped)
- We are blamed for not influencing, "properly"

Chan: A VName who is anti-Comm, says, "I am proud that
~~some~~ of our people are able to resist and defy
the Americans — the scientists, the four-star generals,
the pilots & carriers... " VName war was brought
to an end by little NVN, but no more destruction than
necessary.

Don't handicap ourselves vs. VC. We assume wrongly that nationalism/patriotism were on our side for "local foreigners".

[Be to them — Su/Hung still "city boys."

But: What?

[We need VNese help.

→ we need VNese dedication, motivation, leadership
(want VNese to feel respons. for improving GVN
(+ reform in RVNAF, bureaucracy))

→ need VNese pride, sense of participation, power,

→ reduce intolerability of US presence. dignity

"Civic Action" at COMUSMACV/ambass level.

Roots of anti-US feeling: US power; lack of
political benefit to VNese from US power/presence.

We need GVN with which to "share blame"

Efforts: maybe, ^{now} support for VC (peasants, students, strugger/leader leaders).

But more: non-involvement, apathy.

We have asked how to win hearts of peasants; first, win hearts of leaders/cadre (then, of those in "secure" areas; any...

^{Theory}
Political strategies:

1. Do it ourselves: Failed
2. Motivate VNese "easily": under authoritarian regime. ^{Failed}
3. Motivate VNese "democratically" (but at US telecomm +
Clam: good groups initiative, and with US pressure? Untried; but...
4. Leave them alone. Untried...

Complete Sheridan/Apple/RFK critiques

by putting ⁽²⁾ US (+ Thunders) into picture; ^{style +} politics
and ⁽³⁾ "Clam-types" ↓ (as well as Thim types).

[Even Tri Quang relied on USG + press!]
felt "betrayed." Clemine Thi.]

Yet Clam: (a) did maintain ties to real "neutralists"
and NLF!

(b) was moving toward them

(though, ties to US fell apart!

see his "Program")

GVN B, totally dependent on US, accuses C. of too close relations with US; US fails to defend C, though he did have close relations; because he no longer does, precisely because he would not accept his or VN's total dependence (as GVN does).

ex-VM, and "good guys" believe in American-backed democracy ^{and US aid} ~~is~~ desirable policy for VM, fighting Cons. Naive + misled, not because US-backed dictatorship is the answer, but because

(a) US will back dictatorship, "they say,"

not democracy (esp. given military problems, Cons); which will merely prolong war, prevent useful developments;

(b) US will tear up country

(like Thai, Bt...)

C. resented Americans more than GVN mil. commanders

(former subordinates of C, or...); distrustful notions of latter;

C. would not play ball, with Coms or anyone:

- (1) beret X X X X X
(2) CIA,
(3) Thang
(4) Thien, Thang

Democracy in village

(econ og
consultation
recall
grievances
elections — they must wait)

Democracy in Saigon

nationalist image:

Did not want PC/DC to appear US puppet; }

RD Code

broke with CIA

Did not want GVN to appear puppet

(repressed leaders; NA;
Paris negot.)

Broke with GVN, US Embassy

PAT Program

(Scotton, Kelly
mai

Concept (De Silva): ^Pvery
simple....

Ving Tan

Chair: CG, Cadre : purpose: motivate to participate
(hard, long, civil actions)

"If C was a Com — show all good men on the Com side." I don't believe this; but it does show fate of good men on GVN side: humiliation, isolation, non-achievement, (condemnation, guilt) prison, silence, exile, death: perhaps (as with Thao) all of these.

Cham on POC

Working for GVN, Cham never brought himself to say: Without change in the GVN, the Village Campaign cannot work.

(RAMJET: next step is to see, "Without change in the US")

Instead, his hope was that US influence could either change GVN behavior, or GVN, or could compensate: bring about change at lower levels (Prov. down).

(Note C/A backing of Cham as PC).

Thus, C. was looked to US to:

(a) modify VMC policies

(b) provide resources for non-violent development.

A frail need — esp. in presence of Com ~~the~~ military threats. Rather, US could be expected to:

(a) back mil. dir. & puppets.

(b) emphasize short-term, non-developmental aid (mil. aid)

(c) use mil. approach, air: hurry traditional values for non the Com.

VM

20-26

C: backs Dao Dai

backs Diem 30-39

backs US

(Buddo

next: ?

ie,

2X-VM: nationalist fathers, keras

training as cadre

rose on ability

respect for ^{the} presents; + other side
knowledge of

Get Chan made "wrong" choices.

VM/VC: self-help.

Chan: wanted development to be non-zero-sum; ^{showing} D-V

Did the: (1) Overestimate willingness of elites to

change social patterns (even with compensation)

(risks of status, security, comfort)

(2) Overestimate will. of US to provide resources,
or prod elites?

By not joining VC — by encouraging
US involvement — Dan et al ensured
US participation in war, devolution of
society [“sociocide”] and of traditional
values: indefinite dependence on US aid.

This is the end of Third Force hopes.

[See EGC: Nhu kills Thé —
jails Dan —]

(Did EGC press for fight against B.X.
because he expected TTM Thé to profit?!)

Is there really a “third possibility,” as
I hoped in 1965-66: if US is drawn in
to fight a Com threat?

(Those US who think as I do will
be outnumbered — unless special
circumstances, as in Philb, 1980)

5. Features of Chan case: (outstanding: ^{see} petition)

(a) C. known to USG + GVN as anti-Com.

(b) WR (This is the meaning of C's long assoc. with US, CIA; and US knowledge of brother).

(b) C. only charged with seeing brother; this not enough to induce Deps. to remove immunity. (or T to press case, early).

(c) Real triggering events: (a) ceasefire, NLF talks.

(b) (Minkung; Chappaguldik)

(c) Thang.

(d) Bribes, threats, ^{bids} hold, police;

Petition: Unconvict.

Forgery.

Mock trial. Appeal.

Arrest. [New trial? witnesses, lawyers?
Sublime Court?]

RR

6. Role of US: (1) Bunker attitude on C, Thien.

(2) Wrong predictions: Ignorance of C.

(3) CIA split.

(4) Ineffectiveness of Wash; of Bunker "protest"

(5) Acceptance of T. methods, "stability."

"If correct
elections..."

Savageist: C had raised question of ^{political} oxygen with
him some time before. Authorization to grant
had been requested by the Mission but Washington
refusal had just been received. I had been
instructed to so inform C.

San. thought effort to get votes might well
succeed; he had been told by Mass Assembly
members that Thine was threatening to dissolve the
Assembly if it did not act against C.

~~What~~

Why is T pursuing C?

Why has C's mind been lifted?

Why are Americans accepting?

What will consequences be?

Silenced majority

VNZ will fail to build Gov that can survive without US pressure; in fact, without US intervention to suppress revolt. And it will fail to maintain by GVN pressure outside cities: for internal reasons, not VC/NV4 strength. It can resist, & cut down US casualties: until overthrown or paralyzed by non-Comm revolt.

Clan Arrest

1. End of hopes of a Gov that ^{can} ~~stand~~

(a) stand by itself against Coms, without US.

(b) ^{can} stand against non-Coms without US.

(c) will talk to NLF, accept compromise to end war;

(d) provide US pressure with any base of legitimacy.

(Only the invitation to stay of an NA that can speak freely on subjects of war & peace, or US pressure, can give US pressure legitimacy.)

[Our role in VN is no more legitimate than that of France after 1946.

(Pretensions, burden of responsibility...)

Makes "self-determination"

2. Why? (a) Demonstrates T. has the will and capability to use threats, bribes, and actual use of mob and police violence in the NA to override the Diem's will, strip anyone of

immunity ;

(b) US will back this ; or can be defied
US will abandon a VN war ;

(even when US: (1) has long assoc. with Diem
(2) knows he is anti-Comm.)

(c) Thus, to talk of ceasefire or coexistence with
Comm is to ask for 20-year sentence.

d. To criticize Thang operations, likewise ;
and Thang will succeed.

e. Very brutality, illegality of T's actions mean,
if successful, he will not be restrained,
and need not be.

f. US shows no concern for principle, Constitution ;
broaching ; opposition ; talks ; Buddo.

(g) No role in Gov for Buddo.

(h) Weakness of critics in US ; Fulbright, etc.

Support of US for repression, Diem's policy.

3. Diemism:

- (a) Narrow, exclusionist politics
- (b) Base of: Any ⁽²⁾ Cath, Northerners, US.
GVN?
- (c) Police repression.
- (d) No compromise with Cons, locally or nationally.
- (e) No talks with Cons.
- (A) Disregard of Constitutional forms.
(rigged elections; Dr Dan; arrests, 1960)

Diemism without Diem — but with 400,000 US,
arm, money, etc., + US committed against
coups or uprisings

[Admin. policy against a future
Halliburton, or Budds]

We will not get "stable, effective police state."

4. US mil. occupation, in support of ~~the~~
raked gang rule, ^{by} a military Mafia.

A gov that won't let us go, can't survive
without US help either against Cons or non-Cons —

// Nixon Policy ^{raises questions for} ~~non-Cons~~ ^{non-Cons} result ~~MAFIA~~, condemns
us to deter it or suppress it: can succeed, at cost of
GVN paralysis.